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Jennifer S. Bard & Lindsay Penrose† 
Abstract 
One of the plots of the Canadian science fiction thriller Orphan 
Black involves a scheme to create dozens of siblings by harvesting the 
eggs of one woman, fertilizing them with the sperm of a single man, 
and implanting them for gestation in dozens of apparently willing 
surrogates.1 The casualness of the procedure speaks to how 
comfortable we have all become with reproduction by technology. Yet 
there are still aspects of this process that remain outside the 
normative boundaries of most of our worldviews. This article 
considers recent advances in assisted reproductive technology (ART) 
that can result in a viable, fertilized embryo even when the mother is 
herself either permanently unconscious from a severe injury or has 
actually lost all brain function and therefore meets the legal criteria 
for brain death. It reviews these advances and applies them to four 
scenarios, or vignettes, that represent different concerns about the 
prospective mother’s intent to reproduce before losing her ability to 
give consent. 
 
 
† Jennifer S. Bard, J.D, M.P.H., Ph.D. is the Alvin R. Alison Professor of 
Law and Director of the Health Law Program and the J.D./M.D. Dual 
Degree Program at Texas Tech University School of Law. She is also an 
Adjunct Professor at Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center 
School of Medicine in the Department of Psychiatry. Lindsay Penrose, 
Ph.D. is a Research Assistant Professor in the Department of Obstetrics 
and Gynecology at the Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center 
School of Medicine. Thank you to Professor Judith Daar who graciously 
provided comments on a draft of this document. Thank you also to 
Texas Tech University School of Law students Kathy Kassabian ‘13, 
Anna Acosta ‘16, and Maryam Aratsu ‘16, who provided very helpful 
research assistance. 
1. Orphan Black, To Hound Nature in Her Wanderings (BBC television 
broadcast May 24, 2014), available at 
http://www.bbcamerica.com/orphan-black/guide/season-2/episode-6/.  
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Introduction 
Assisted reproductive technology (ART) has become what 
Harvard Business School Professor Clayton Christensen would 
describe as a “disruptive technology” because it has transformed “the 
way we live and work, enable[d] new business models, and provide[d] 
an opening for new players to upset the established order.”2 
Christensen’s examples are of companies that survived sweeping 
 
2. See generally James Manyika et al., Disruptive Technologies: Advances 
That Will Transform Life, Business, and the Global Economy, 
MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST. (May 2013), 
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/business_technology/disruptive_tec
hnologies; Clayton Christensen et al., Will Disruptive Technologies Cure 
Health Care?, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 2000, at 102, 102. 
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changes like the automobile or the personal computer—changes that 
destroyed other companies.3 But these developments in reproductive 
medicine that make it possible for doctors and scientists to 
successfully extract reproductive material from women who have been 
declared dead or who are in a permanent vegetative state threaten to 
have the same kind of disruptive effect on our current understanding 
of human reproduction. The particular disruptive technologies here 
are ones that make it possible to harvest and freeze unfertilized 
human oocytes so that they can indefinitely be preserved for later 
fertilization. The extraction and freezing process can occur while the 
ovaries are still functioning within the body of a woman or after they 
are extracted and transplanted into the body of another woman. 
The legal and ethical implications of this new technology make it 
important for lawyers, ethicists, doctors, and scientists to pause and 
consider creating a framework or taxonomy about how to respond to 
requests by family or other surrogates to retrieve unfertilized eggs 
from women in permanent vegetative states (in other words, women 
who are still alive) or women who meet the legal criteria for brain 
death yet remain sustained through medical equipment and 
technology. Although there is substantial literature about requests to 
harvest sperm from men who are dead, the issue is far different with 
women because the process is far less direct.4 In general, men produce 
sperm on a continuous basis with a ready supply always available in 
the testicles. To retrieve the number of oocytes necessary for 
fertilization outside of the body, however, it is necessary to start a 
course of hormone therapy that induces the ovaries to make multiple 
eggs available for harvest. 
This article considers the process of extracting, implanting, and 
requesting genetic material and in the context of four scenarios, 
outlines how medical personnel who receive these requests, and the 
lawyers and ethicists that medical personnel may consult for advice, 
should respond in the context of the current laws and norms in the 
United States. It develops and analyzes three scenarios involving 
female posthumous reproduction (PAR) that exemplify the extent to 
which current advances in science have outstripped any form of legal 
regulation and are in need, at least, of ethical guidelines. Although 
this state of lawlessness is in general true of many topics in ART, so 
far none of these cases have reached the legal system or have 
motivated practitioners or scholars to develop guidelines. By failing to 
 
3. See Clayton Christensen, Disruptive Technologies: Catching the Wave, 
HARV. BUS. REV., Jan. 1995, at 43, 43. 
4. Cynthia E. Fruchtman, Tales from the Crib: Posthumous Reproduction 
and ART, 33 WHITTIER L. REV. 311, 318–321 (2012) (reviewing state 
laws governing male posthumous reproduction). 
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develop legislation in anticipation of, or even in response to change, 
the United States has essentially ceded control of important decisions 
affecting fundamental constitutional rights to the doctors who must 
make rapid decisions about how to use these powerful innovations. 
This is in contrast to the decisions made by many other countries 
with similar access to these reproductive technologies that control 
their use through central regulatory bodies.5 
This article will consider the legal, ethical, medical, and scientific 
issues relevant to the use of these technologies in clinical care. The 
intent is not to supersede medical judgment in areas of clinical care, 
but rather to introduce transparent guidelines so that all involved 
know the perimeters of what interventions are and are not legal.  
Because this article is authored by a law professor who teaches 
and writes in the area of bioethics—Professor Jennifer S. Bard—and a 
research scientist who works in the area of fertility and infertility—
Lindsay Penrose, Ph.D.—this article presents a multi-disciplinary 
approach to what is likely to become an increasingly common 
dilemma as medical science becomes better able to collect and 
preserve unfertilized ovum for future reproduction. It will include not 
just a review of reported cases, but also the review of hypothetical 
scenarios in which a clinic might be asked to facilitate assisted 
reproduction with patients who are already dead and hypothetical 
scenarios developed based upon Dr. Penrose’s experience in assisted 
reproduction utilizing currently available techniques in the ART 
laboratory. 
I. Background on Artificial Reproductive 
Technology 
A. History of the Regulation of Reproductive Technology 
We in the United States do not, of course, live in the dystopian 
world of fantasy novels where women have obligations to maximize 
their fertility.6 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the rights 
of both women and men not to reproduce are as strong as those 
 
5. See generally Alicia Ouellette et al., Lessons Across the Pond: Assisted 
Reproductive Technology in the United Kingdom and the United States, 
31 AM. J.L. & MED. 419, 419 (2005) (contrasting the U.S. system with 
those of countries where the government regulates access to assisted 
reproductive technology); Kirsten Riggan, G12 Country Regulations of 
Assisted Reproductive Technologies, CTR. FOR BIOETHICS & HUMAN 
DIGNITY (Oct. 01, 2010), https://cbhd.org/content/g12-country-
regulations-assisted-reproductive-technologies. 
6. See, e.g., MARGARET ATWOOD, THE HANDMAID’S TALE (1985). 
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protecting the right to procreate without government interference.7 
However, the landmark cases involving childbearing occurred well 
before the advent of technology that permitted first the extraction of 
oocytes and then their fertilization outside the body.8 The only U.S. 
Supreme Court case directly addressing reproductive technology is 
one interpreting the rights of posthumously conceived children to 
inherit under pension benefits.9 The law has always lagged behind 
scientific and medical advances in reproductive technology. 
Reproductive technology today depends on advances in 
cryopreservation to both freeze and safely thaw reproductive material. 
The first successful cryopreservation was of human sperm in 195310 
and the next was of fertilized embryos.11 As discussed below, the 
freezing of unfertilized oocytes was a considerable technological 
barrier that has only recently been breached.12 
Looking at the issue as two ends of a spectrum, the gestation 
period required for a viable birth has been steadily decreasing with 
the development of medicines and machines that can sustain the life 
and growth of a fetus that has only experienced half of the typical 
gestation time in its mother’s womb. Emerging as a third lane in the 
 
7. I. Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not to Procreate, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 1135, 1135 (2008). 
8. Ann Bindu Thomas, Note, Avoiding EMBRYOS “R” US: Toward a 
Regulated Fertility Industry, 27 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 247, 251 n.29 
(2008). 
9. Astrue v. Capato, 132 S.Ct. 2021 (2012). 
10. Yoel Shufaro & Joseph G. Schenker, Cryopreservation of Human 
Genetic Material, 1205 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 220, 220 (Sept. 2010). 
11. Jessica H. Schultz, Note, Development Of Ectogenesis: How Will 
Artificial Wombs Affect The Legal Status Of A Fetus Or Embryo?, 84 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 877, 884 (2010). 
12. Ri-Cheng Chian et al., In Vitro Maturation of Human Immature 
Oocytes for Fertility Preservation, 99 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1173, 1174 
(2013); Am. Soc’y Reprod. Med. Prac. Committee, Ovarian Tissue and 
Oocyte Cyropreservation, 90 FERTILITY & STERILITY S241, S241 (2008); 
see 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(1) (2006) (excluding the term gametes or ova 
specifically from the definition of a human organ); Uniform Anatomical 
Gift Act, § 1(7) (2006) (amended 2008) (defining the word “part” as “an 
organ, an eye, or tissue of a human being”). There is some debate about 
whether the UAGA prohibits the sale of eggs because the definition of 
organ under the 1987 UAGA is broad and encompasses “blood, fluid, or 
other portion of the human body.”; see Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, § 
1(7) (1987) (defining the word “part” as “an organ, tissue, eye, bone, 
artery, blood, fluid, or other portion of a human body”); see LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 9:122 (2008) (“The sale of human ovum, fertilized human 
ovum, or human embryo is expressly prohibited.”); see Nicole Noyes et 
al., Oocyte Cryopreservation as a Fertility Preservation Measure for 
Cancer Patients, 23 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 323, 324 (2011). 
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race to disruption are advances in transplanting ovaries from one 
human to another and transplanting the uterus from one animal to 
another.13 At this pace, it would be irresponsible to deny that these 
technologies will not at some point merge into the development of a 
safe method of transferring an embryo at the very earliest stages of 
development from one womb to another. How that transfer occurs we 
cannot yet know, but the ability to interrupt a pregnancy at any 
point without harm to the developing embryo is a certainty.  
B. History of Organ Donation 
The first successful human organ transplant occurred in 1960.14 
The need for legal regulation of the process soon became clear. 
Individual states began passing laws to standardize both organ 
donation and organ distribution. These processes became standardized 
as states adopted the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act.15 The National 
Organ Transplant Act of 1984 (NOTA) defines the term “human 
organ” to “mean the human (including fetal) kidney, liver, heart, 
lung, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, and skin or any 
subpart thereof and any other human organ (or any subpart thereof, 
including that derived from a fetus) specified by the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services by regulation.”16 While each state has its 
own definition of death, all have been amended to allow a person 
being sustained on machines to be declared dead for the purpose of 
organ donations. It is also illegal anywhere in the United States to sell 
organs.17 
 
13. Univ. of Gothenburg, World’s First Child Born After Uterine 
Transplantation, SCI. DAILY (Oct. 7, 2014), 
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2014/10/141007092110.htm; Mats 
Brannstrom et al., Livebirth After Uterine Transplantation, 385 LANCET 
607, 607 (Feb. 15, 2015). 
14. Christine J. Watson, Organ Transplantation: Historical Perspective and 
Current Practice, 108(S1) BRIT. J. ANAESTHESIA. i29, i29 (2012); see 
generally, Janelle E. Thompson, Note, The Eggsploitation of the United 
States’ Organ and Egg Donation Systems, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. 469, 482 
(2013).  
15. Anatomical Gift Act (2006), UNIFORM LAW COMM’N, 
http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Anatomical+Gift+Act+ (2006) 
(last updated 2014); Legislative Fact Sheet - Anatomical Gift Act 
(2006), UNIFORM LAW COMM’N, 
http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Anatomical%20
Gift%20Act%20(2006) (last updated 2014); Joseph L. Verheijde et al., 
The United States Revised Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (2006): New 
Challenges to Balancing Patient Rights and Physician Responsibilities, 2 
PHILOS., ETHICS, & HUMANITIES IN MED. 18, 19-20 (2007). 
16. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(1) (2012). 
17. 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2006) (banning the sale of human organs). 
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The legal regulation of reproductive material depends on how it is 
classified. Sperm is not considered a tissue under these regulations 
because like blood (but not kidneys or hearts), sperm is replenished 
by the body.18 Oocytes, on the other hand, although renewable, are 
regulated as tissue that can be donated.19 
One of the legal issues that needed to be resolved in order for 
organ donation to become widespread was a definition of death that 
allowed for the retrieval of usable organs. This has proved one of the 
more difficult legal and ethical issues about organ donation because of 
religious and ethical objections.20 As organ transplantation has 
become more common, many religions have chosen to convene 
councils to consider the ethics of both receiving and donating organs. 
For example, the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR) 
based in Dublin, Ireland issued a fatwa on organ donation finding 
that “(1) that the potential benefits of such an operation outweigh the 
probable ensuing harms and (2) that the purpose for this operation is 
legitimate which is the case, among others, when replacing a missing 
organ, restoring its shape or usual function or reforming a defect or 
removing ugliness that causes psychological or physical harm.”21 
C. The Law of Posthumous Conception 
Children have been born after the death of the father for as long 
as there have been children and fathers. More recently, children have 
been born after the death of their mother. Indeed, the development of 
 
18. See Rob Stein, A Struggle To Define ‘Death’ For Organ Donors, Shots, 
NPR (Mar. 28, 2012), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2012/03/27/149463045/a-struggle-to-
define-death-for-organ-donors. 
19. See Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible 
Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 33 
See Ina. N Cholst, Symposium, Changing Conceptions: Exploring the 
Medical and Legal Advances in Fertility Preservation: Twenty-First 
Annual Law Review Symposium: Article: Oncofertility: Preservation of 
Reproductive Potential, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 763, 766-67 (2012); Naomi 
R. Cahn, The New Kinship, 100 GEO. L.J. 367 (2012). 
20. Mohamed Y. Rady & Joseph L. Verheijde, Brain Dead Patients Are 
Not Cadavers: The Need to Revise the Definition of Death in Muslim 
Countries, 25(1) HEC FORUM 25, 25 (2013). 
21. Mohammed Ghaly, Religio-Ethical Discussions on Organ Donation 
Among Muslims in Europe: An Example of Transnational Islamic 
Bioethics, 15(2) MED. HEALTH CARE & PHIL. 207, 209 (2012). See 
generally Paolo Bruzzone, Religious Aspects of Organ Transplantation, 
40 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 1064, 1064 (2008) (concluding that 
although “no religion formally forbids donation or receipt of organs or is 
against transplantation from living or deceased donors . . . donors may 
be discouraged by Native Americans, Roma Gypsies, Confucians, 
Shintoists, and some Orthodox rabbis.”). 
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technology to preserve lung and heart function mechanically has 
resulted in cases like that of Marlise Muñoz in Texas where 
pregnancies continued even when the women themselves were 
permanently unconscious or even, as in Ms. Muñoz’ case, already 
dead.22 
But until very recently, in every case the only biological 
possibility was for a child to be born no more than ten months after 
the death of its father. Conception, as far as history records, occurred 
only when both parents were alive.23 It was therefore safe for the law 
to establish boundaries to claims of paternity that paralleled the outer 
limit of natural gestation.24  
These cases involving disputes over the status of children 
conceived after a parent’s death demonstrate the inadequacy of U.S. 
laws to keep up with changing norms. One of the reasons that the law 
in the United States is in its current unsettled state, however, is that 
the development of effective methods of freezing sperm for future use 
did not result in development of laws regulating the use of this 
technology or anticipating the inevitable disputes that would arise 
once it came into common use.25 This puts the United States in direct 
contrast with most other countries offering similar medical services 
that have highly developed laws governing their use. This lack of 
forethought has left U.S. courts again and again scrambling with cases 
of “first impression” as frozen sperm cases progressed to the far more 
troubling issue of the frozen embryo. By again failing to act, the 
 
22. Ms. Muñoz’s case had the added complication of her being kept on a 
ventilator against her family’s wishes because of a state law that 
prohibited the withdrawal of life-sustaining technology if the result 
terminated a pregnancy. See Manny Fernandez, Texas Woman is Taken 
Off Life Support After Order, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/27/us/texas-hospital-to-end-life-
support-for-pregnant-brain-dead-woman.html; Manny Fernandez & Erik 
Eckholm, Pregnant, and Forced to Stay on Life Support, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 7, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/08/us/pregnant-and-
forced-to-stay-on-life-support.html?_r=0. 
23. Posthumous Reproduction, AM. SOC. REPRODUCTIVE MED., 
http://www.asrm.org/topics/detail.aspx?id=2274 (last visited Jan. 9, 
2014). 
24. KATHERINE DWYER, OLR REPORT 2012-R-0319, INHERITANCE RIGHTS OF 
POSTHUMOUSLY CONCEIVED CHILDREN IN OTHER STATES (Conn. 2012) 
available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/rpt/2012-R-0319.htm. 
25. See, e.g., Rachel Anne Fenton, Catholic Doctrine Versus Women’s 
Rights: The New Italian Law on Assisted Reproduction, 14 MED. L. 
REV. 73, 73 (2006) (noting that Italy is the latest country in Western 
Europe to pass a law regulating ART); Fergus Walsh, Let Me Keep My 
Dead Husband’s Sperm, BBC NEWS (Dec. 4, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-25188341. 
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United States essentially ceded the oversight of this technology to the 
probate courts that were tasked with determining fundamental legal 
status issues involving custody, inheritance, and even citizenship.26 
Whatever laws exist directly affecting those who become involved 
with ART are those that describe the legal status of the embryo itself. 
In other words, the law in the United States focuses on the legal 
status of the relationship between a child conceived through ART and 
its parent rather than the actual process of ART itself. 
The purpose of this article is not to further review the havoc 
caused by legislative inaction in the face of what has become the 
everyday reality that children who are the exact genetic heirs of their 
biological mothers and fathers can be born years if not decades after 
the death of either parent; rather, our purpose is to look forward in 
the hopes of avoiding the even greater havoc, if not catastrophic 
chaos, that the next round of disruptive technology may cause if 
nothing is done. This article will do so by using the cases of Marlise 
Muñoz to bring together the legal, ethical, and medical issues that are 
already emerging and, which if not addressed carefully, will create 
problems that will make us nostalgic for the relatively simple 
questions of whether or not a child conceived with the frozen sperm of 
its mother’s dead husband is entitled to his social security benefits. 
Ms. Muñoz’s tragedy is helpful here because it raises issues beyond 
custody and inheritance that lay at the core of the protection that 
individuals have from state interference with their decision to 
reproduce or not.  
For the purposes of this analysis, the dispositive fact in Ms. 
Muñoz’s case—whether she was alive or dead—is only part of the 
larger concern of what powers the state is likely to have when 
technology permits the development of a fertilized embryo without 
any burden to a woman who no longer wishes to be pregnant. 
Moreover, the Texas law which prohibited the termination of 
mechanical support for a woman who was pregnant is a variation on a 
law that exists in thirty-five other states.27 Although it seems 
farfetched that a state could ever compel a woman to reproduce, laws 
such as Louisiana’s, for instance, that prohibit the destruction of a 
fertilized embryo could well be a harbinger of what might come if it 
 
26. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF ST., ACQUISITION OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP BY BIRTH 
ABROAD TO U.S. CITIZEN PARENT, 7 FOREIGN AFF. MANUAL (FAM) 1130 
(2013), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86757.pdf 
(describing each state’s requirements for determining the legitimacy of a 
child, and thus its citizenship status under several scenarios). 
27. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.049 (West 2013). 
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were more practical to ensure that every fertilized embryo could be 
gestated to viability.28 
This article will also introduce to the discussion the role that 
technology that allows for the extracting and freezing of unfertilized 
oocytes might play in the development of laws that preserve potential 
life. For example, the ability to produce children from stored genetic 
material has wrought havoc in matters of estate planning because it 
leaves open the possibility of heirs being born decades after the 
testator’s death. It also has created difficulties in administering 
government survivor benefit programs because, again, claimants can 
be born and make a claim for benefits long after their parent’s 
death.29 Both of these issues are addressed as matters of state law in 
that each state has the authority to define who is a “child” of an 
individual parent.30 In matters of entitlement to federal survivor 
benefits, the Supreme Court in Astrue v. Capato interpreted the 
Social Security Act’s definition of “child” to exclude benefits from 
twins conceived after their father’s death.31 But that does not limit 
Congress’ ability to amend the law.32 Nor does it affect matters of 
state law such as private inheritance or eligibility for state benefits.33 
 
28. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1 (2008) (prohibiting the destruction of a 
fertilized embryo could well be a harbinger of what might come if it 
were more practical to ensure that every fertilized embryo could be 
gestated to viability). 
29. See Brooke Shemer, Estate Planning for the Posthumously Conceived 
Child: A Blueprint for the Sperm Donor, 42 U. BALT. L. REV. 181, 185 
(2012). 
30. See Fruchtman, supra note 4, at 318–322. 
31. Astrue v. Capato, 132 S.Ct. 2021, 2026 (2012); Judith Daar, Is There 
Life After Death? The Rise of the High-Tech Family, CAL. ST. B.J. 
(2012), available at 
http://www.calbarjournal.com/april2012/topheadlines/th3.aspx. 
(“Capato is not only interesting because it raises novel legal issues 
involving posthumously conceived offspring, but because it displays the 
import of advancing reproductive technologies by joining three other 
federal court of appeals decisions involving virtually identical fact 
scenarios.”). 
32. Julie Shapiro, Michigan Weighs in on Posthumous Conception—
Children Are Not Heirs, No Social Security, 
JULIESHAPIRO.WORDPRESS.COM (Jan. 9, 2013), 
http://julieshapiro.wordpress.com/2013/01/09/michigan-weighs-in-on-
posthumous-conception-children-are-not-heirs-no-social-security/. 
33. Astrue, 132 S.Ct. at 2032; Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 
N.E.2d 257, 268 (Mass. 2002); Alycia Marie Kennedy, Posthumous 
Conception and the Social Security Act, 54 B.C. L. REV. 821, 841-42 
(2012); Renee H. Sekino, Posthumous Conception: The Birth of a New 
Class, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 362, 364 (2002); Lizzie McLellan, Md. 
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But the issue here is not one of inheritance from a dead person; 
rather, the issue is one of the intent of an incompetent or dead person 
to reproduce at all.34 Since the advent of equipment that could 
artificially maintain heart and lung function after severe brain injury, 
there have been many reported instances of maintaining a pregnant 
woman on life-sustaining medical equipment long enough to allow the 
fetus to obtain viability. However, those situations only arise long 
after a child has been conceived and has begun to develop in its 
mother’s womb. 
New advances in the science of ART have made it possible to 
induce pregnancies in, or extract reproductive material from, 
individuals who were not pregnant when they have lost capacity.35 
The ability to do this raises complex issues of ethics and of law. As 
Dr. Gary S. Nakhuda explains, “[i]n some instances, initiation of 
posthumous conception may be a legitimate practice that engenders 
beneficence and accounts for the best interests of all parties involved. 
In other situations, it may be misguided and not respectful of the 
rights of the decedent, the offspring, or other family members.”36 
These are, of course, normative issues (i.e., whether posthumous 
conception should be allowed) because such interventions are not 
illegal. 
There are four major scientific advances that have opened the 
door to posthumous pregnancies: (1) advanced life support that 
permits continuation of pregnancy when the mother is on life support; 
(2) posthumous retrieval of reproductive material (including a focus 
on both eggs and sperm); (3) transplant of ovaries or the uterus; and 
(4) cryopreservation of embryos conceived outside of the body.  
 
Considers Limits on Posthumous Conception, S. MD. ONLINE (Mar. 29, 
2012), http://somd.com/news/headlines/2012/15315.shtml. 
34. See Daar, supra note 31 (“Intent figures prominently into assisted 
conception because typically the parties must perform an act they know 
can lead to the birth of a child.”); Arianna Renan Barzilay, You’re on 
Your Own, Baby: Reflections on Capato’s Legacy, 46 IND. L. REV. 557, 
559 (2013) (“One social implication on the Capato decision concerns the 
ability to create children without sexual intercourse . . . and to enable 
new forms of families to function.”). 
35. See Devon D. Williams, Over My Dead Body: The Legal Nightmare and 
Medical Phenomenon of Posthumous Conception Through Postmortem 
Sperm Retrieval, 34 CAMPBELL L. REV. 181, 182 (2012), available at 
http://law.campbell.edu/lawreview/articles/34-1-181.pdf; Irit 
Rosenblum, The Biological Will – A New Paradigm in ART?, NEW 
FAMILY ORG. (Feb. 25, 2013), 
http://www.newfamily.org.il/en/4905/the-biological-will%E2%84%A2-
%E2%80%93-a-new-paradigm-in-art/. 
36. Gary S. Nakhuda, Posthumous Assisted Reproduction 28(4) SEM. 
REPROD. MED. 329 (2010). 
Health Matrix·Volume 25·2015  
Responding to Requests for Assisted Reproductive Technology Intervention 
Involving Women Who Cannot Give Consent 
238 
D. Legal Obligations to Maintain a Pregnancy 
The current framework created by the U.S. Supreme Court 
protects a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy before viability 
through the Court’s creation of a right to privacy and bodily 
integrity. However, that right is not absolute. The state too has an 
interest in the continued life of the embryo from the point of 
conception; and while the state may not “unduly burden” a woman’s 
ability to terminate a pregnancy before viability, it may nevertheless 
restrict and regulate her ability to do so.37 This focus on a balance 
between the woman and the state has resulted in many states 
mandating the continued life of the fetus when the mother suffers a 
medical event that requires her to be sustained using life support 
equipment. The justification for maintaining the mother’s life in order 
to maintain the fetus’ life, even in the face of a clear advanced 
directive or decision by a lawful surrogate decision maker is that, at 
that point, the burden to the mother in remaining pregnant is lower 
than the state’s interest in preserving life.38 Although these cases are 
rare, there are many reported cases of pregnant women on life support 
equipment delivering a healthy baby.39 
These laws and the undue burden balancing test, however, only 
apply to a woman who is already pregnant. Until the emergence of 
the disruptive effects of reproductive technology that allowed women 
to reproduce without becoming pregnant, U.S. courts had maintained 
a bright line between the right not to become pregnant or maintain a 
pregnancy, and any obligation to actually reproduce.40 Beginning in 
 
37. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 US 833, 877 (1992) (holding that a 
statute regulating abortion is unconstitutional if it imposes an “undue 
burden” by having the “purpose or effect” of “placing a substantial 
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable 
fetus.”). 
38. See, e.g., State Laws on Pregnancy and Health Care Directives, NOLO, 
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/state-laws-pregnancy-health-
care-directives.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2014) (“Although health care 
providers are generally required to comply with the wishes you set out 
in your health care documents, pregnancy creates a big exception.”). 
39. See, e.g., Mary R. Anderlik, End-of-Life Decision-making for Pregnant 
Women, UNIV. OF HOUS. L. CTR. HEALTH L. & POL’Y INST. (Aug. 12, 
1999), 
http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/Reproductive/990812E
OLDecisions.html; Woman on Life Support Gives Birth to Baby Girl, 
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2005), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/aug/03/nation/na-baby3. 
40. Lindsay F. Wiley, Health Law as Social Justice, 25 CORNELL J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 47, 60 (2014) (discussing reproductive justice as “the right 
to have children, not have children, and to parent the children we have 
in safe and healthy environments.” (quoting Why is Reproductive 
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the early 1990s, courts began to see disputes between couples that 
had created embryos, cryopreserved them, but now disagreed if they 
should ever be advanced from the frozen state to implantation to 
birth.41 Courts—and society—were faced with what appeared to be a 
scenario from a dystopian fantasy—could a woman or a man be 
forced to go ahead with a decision to bring children into the world in 
what were now changed circumstances?42 
In some of these cases, the parent (again, usually the father) 
objected to being obligated to support a child he no longer wanted. In 
others, the parent simply objected to being made a parent against his 
or her will. Courts could have looked at these cases in terms of the 
“buyer’s remorse” that might often happen between conception and 
birth but which had never before given a father the right to back 
out.43 Because the right to terminate a pregnancy was tied to the fact 
that the baby was inside the mother’s body, the Supreme Court 
rejected the father’s right to either stop a termination or require one.44 
Upon birth, every state mandates that a father support his biological 
children regardless of whether he wanted them or not. The purpose of 
these laws is to prevent the child from becoming a financial burden to 
the state. Except for a few rare cases in which the man was deceived 
into impregnating a woman, the law’s perspective is that any man 
engaging in consensual sexual intercourse accepts the risk of becoming 
financially responsible for a resulting child. But courts consider the 
situation of regretful fathers of frozen embryos to be a different 
matter since it was possible to stop the original voluntary act of 
reproduction from resulting in a child. 
 
Justice Important for Women of Color?, SISTER SONG, 
http://sistersong.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id
=141 (last visited Aug. 31, 2014)). 
41. Mark P. Strasser, You Take the Embryos But I Get the House (and the 
Business): Recent Trends in Awards Involving Embryos Upon Divorce, 
57 BUFF. L. REV. 1159, 1159 (2009). 
42. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 591 (1992) (recognizing a right to 
“avoid parenthood” and resolving in the man’s favor a dispute between 
divorcing spouses in which the wife could not gestate the embryos she 
and her ex-husband had created and the husband objected to being 
implanted in a surrogate); see also A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057-
58 (Mass. 2000) (rejecting an agreement between the intended parents 
to go ahead with gestating the embryos created even if they separated 
and writing that “forced procreation is not an area amenable to judicial 
enforcement.”). 
43. See Strasser, supra note 41, at 1166-1168 (discussing the Davis v. Davis 
decision). 
44. Coe v. County of Cook, 162 F.3d 491, 494 (1998). 
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Since resolving these disputes is a matter of state law, and since 
no state has adopted legislation requiring the gestation of embryos 
created in a laboratory, no nationally applicable rule exists. Moreover, 
even in states that have considered these issues and heard individual 
disputes, courts have made it clear that their decisions are based on 
the specific facts in front of them and that they may have decided 
differently under another set of circumstances. Statements by courts 
that distinguish between the interests of a person who has no other 
means of becoming a parent and one who does are the most relevant 
to predicting how a court might view a dispute over retrieving eggs 
from a woman who, because of severe brain damage (including a 
diagnosis of brain death) would not have children. In a case before a 
Massachusetts court in 2000 involving one party who wanted to 
procreate and the other who did not, one of the concurring justices 
agreed that no one should be required to procreate, but noted that 
“[w]e express no opinion in respect of a case in which a party who has 
become infertile seeks use of stored pre-embryos against the wishes of 
her partner . . . .”45 
II.  Posthumous Retrieval of Reproductive Material 
A. Why Extraction of Eggs is Different from Extraction of Sperm 
So far, posthumous assisted reproduction (PAR) situations have 
almost entirely involved posthumous retrieval of sperm for the 
purposes of reproduction. It is a relatively simple procedure since it 
involves removing the epididymis from the testicles in which the 
sperm is stored, retrieving the sperm, and cryopreserving it. Although 
this procedure may not yet be “common,” it is neither complicated 
nor unusual.46 This male dominated trend is changing, however, 
because physicians are increasingly receiving requests to retrieve ovum 
from brain-dead or otherwise critically injured women for the purpose 
 
45. J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 720 (N.J. 2001). 
46. Michelle L. Brenwald & Kay Redeker, A Primer on Posthumous 
Conception and Related Issues of Assisted Reproduction, 38 WASHBURN 
L.J. 599, 600-601 (1999) (describing a 1998 incident in Britain); Ruth 
Zafran, Dying to be a Father: Legal Paternity in Cases of Posthumous 
Conception, 8 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 47, 95 (2008); Neetu 
Chandra, ‘Posthumous Conception’ Joy for Bereaved Families, DAILY 
MAIL, Sept. 2, 2012, 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-
2197283/Posthumous-conception-joy-bereaved-families.html (“In recent 
years, many people in the Capital [of India] are opting for PSR in which 
the sperms of the deceased are banked and later used for giving birth 
through artificial insemination.”). 
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of cryopreserving them for later reproductive purposes.47 This is a 
relatively recent phenomenon because the process of preserving an 
unfertilized human oocyte is more difficult than freezing either sperm 
or embryos since all ARTs must be performed by highly specialized 
clinics. This process is complicated in the case of posthumous retrieval 
because unlike men whose sperm is constantly formed and stored 
within the testis in a mature form, women do not have an easily 
available supply of mature ovum because they mature in a cyclic 
wave each month one at a time or in small numbers. Sperm, however, 
are available in the tens of thousands. Indeed, any woman undergoing 
a form of ART involving egg retrieval must first undergo at least two 
weeks of intensive hormone treatment in order to bring the number of 
ovum needed to maturity.  
When a woman undergoing a form of ART is critically injured, 
and her life is being sustained only through machines that breathe for 
her and maintain her circulation, the medical management and ethical 
issues become far more complex than a man in a similar situation due 
to the need to mature viable oocytes before cryopreservation which 
could require several weeks of long-term life support. While the 
process may become somewhat simpler in the future if it becomes 
possible to remove the ovaries and then subject them to hormonal 
stimulation outside of the body, for now it is impossible.  
B. Recently Reported Case of PAR Involving a Woman 
A recent case from the Massachusetts General Hospital describes 
in detail a tragic situation in which an otherwise healthy young 
woman suffered a pulmonary embolism during an international flight 
(the International Traveler).48 She never regained consciousness and 
although not legally brain-dead, and therefore not an eligible organ 
donor, both her husband and her parents requested that the she be 
maintained on life-sustaining equipment long enough for her ovum to 
be harvested.49 
The request from the family of the International Traveler 
reported in the New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM) triggered 
an explosion of legal, ethical, and medical consultations within the 
 
47. Judith Daar, Is There Life After Death? The Rise of the High-Tech 
Family, 54 CAL. B. J. 16, 17 (2012) (“With an estimated 500,000 to one 
million embryos in frozen storage in the United States, countless vials of 
preserved sperm, and a burgeoning market in egg freezing, the number 
of children born after the death of a gamete provider is sure to swell.”). 
48. See David M. Greer et al., Case 21-2010-A Request for Retrieval of 
Oocytes From a 36-Year-Old Woman with Anoxic Brain Injury, 363 
NEJM 276, 276 (2010). 
49. Id. at 279. 
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hospital that are carefully documented in the NEJM article.50 
Although legal counsel and a law professor were consulted, the matter 
never came before a court but it was instead decided by the medical 
team.51 They refused the family’s request to maintain the patient on 
life-sustaining equipment for the two weeks necessary to administer 
hormone treatment.52 Instead, they gave the family two options: 
either keep her on life-sustaining equipment until she qualified for a 
diagnosis of brain death, or remove the equipment and provide 
comfort care.53 The family chose the latter and the patient died. 
Because requests for posthumous fertility treatment are still rare, 
there are no direct precedents establishing the need for consent for 
posthumous assisted reproductive technology.54 The American Bar 
Association’s draft rules require that ART be “voluntary” but do not 
speak to the status of surrogate decision makers.55 The American 
Society for Reproductive Medicine has published guidelines for PAR 
with the consent of the donors, but does not consider the issue of 
retrieval of reproductive material without prior consent.56 
The staff of the Massachusetts General Hospital which was 
treating the International Traveler proceeded on the advice of their 
legal counsel that there was, in fact, no relevant law which bound 
their decision.57 Instead, they acted like a court and sought evidence 
of their patient’s past wishes about having children. Finding none, 
they concluded that she had not consented to be a parent and 
therefore should not undergo a procedure that would result in her 
involuntarily becoming a mother. 
 
50. See generally id. 
51. Id. at 280-82. 
52. Id. at 282 
53. Id. at 278. 
54. Daniel Sperling, Maternal Brain Death, 30 AM. J. L. & MED. 453, 497 
(2004); Deborah M. Feldman et al., Irreversible Brain Injury During 
Pregnancy: A Case Report and Review of the Literature, 55 CME REV. 
ARTICLE 708, 710 (2000); Bethany Spielman, Pushing the Dead into the 
Next Reproductive Frontier: Post Mortem Gamete Retrieval Under the 
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 37 PHARM. REG. 331, 333 (2009); William 
P. Dillon, Life Support and Maternal Death During Pregnancy, 248 
JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1089, 1089 (1982). 
55. MODEL CODE GOVERNING ASSISTED REPRODUCTION (2007), available at 
http://apps.americanbar.org/family/committees/artmodelcode_feb2007.
pdf. 
56. Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Posthumous 
Reproduction, 82 FERTILITY & STERILITY S260-S262 (2004). 
57. Dillon, supra note 54, at 1089. 
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The question going forward is, whether in the absence of any 
binding law, is it appropriate for an individual hospital to make this 
decision itself, not just on medical grounds, but on legal and ethical 
ones as well? While it is a well-established principle that no patient or 
her surrogate can require a physician to act against his or her best 
medical judgment, it is far less established that a hospital can ignore 
the wishes of a legal surrogate based on its own interpretation of what 
it means to make a voluntary decision to be a parent.58 What the 
hospital did here was to transpose the standards for removing life 
support to one of preserving the option to reproduce. They did so 
because they saw surrogate decision-making for reproduction as 
different from surrogate decision making to withdraw life support or 
to allow organ donation. Other authors also see a difference. Dr. Gary 
S. Nakhuda writes in Seminars in Reproductive Medicine: 
[u]nlike other medical decisions that a proxy may authorize on 
behalf of a medically incompetent patient, the person making a 
decision on a patient’s behalf for perimortem gamete retrieval 
may stand to directly benefit from the procedure. Unlike organ 
donation, procurement of gametes is not an altruistic, lifesaving 
procedure to help an anonymous individual but an elective 
procedure serving the interest of the requesting party.59 
In the larger picture, few hospitals have the kind of resources that 
are available to Massachusetts General Hospital that allowed it to 
conduct such a comprehensive investigation in a relatively short time. 
Moreover, as short as the time available was in the case of the 
comatose International Traveler, there are cases within the experience 
of one of the co-authors, Dr. Penrose, in which the decision whether 
or not to attempt to retrieve gametes postmortem must be made 
within minutes rather than days or even hours because of the natural 
deterioration of human tissue after death. 
The special characteristics of retrieving oocytes requires 
considerable interaction between the doctors and scientists who 
facilitate PAR and the patient who is at best completely unresponsive 
and may well be legally dead. This is quite different from the normal 
structure of their work with women who come to them wanting to be 
parents now or at least, in the case of ovum preservation, in the very 
near future. Even women who donate ovum are doing so with the 
documented intent of passing to someone else their ability to have a 
child from their own ovum. But a woman whose family is requesting 
 
58. See generally MARSHA GARRISON & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE LAW OF 
BIOETHICS: INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY AND SOCIAL REGULATION 514-530, 
869-882 (2d. ed. 2009). 
59. Nakhuda, supra note 36, at 331. 
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perimortem or posthumous ovum retrieval by definition cannot 
become the mother of her own child nor has she documented her 
intent to forgo this right. Unlike the women in cases where fatal 
injury comes after an established pregnancy, these patients have not 
even expressed an interest in reproducing, let alone the intent to do 
so. 
C. Reproductive Exceptionalism 
Every state has some version of a law that protects the ability of 
individuals to not only express in advance their wishes for the kind of 
end-of-life care they want to receive, but also to designate the person 
who can make those decisions on their behalf. These statutes provide 
enforceable authority for decisions to direct care including the ability 
to terminate care that is sustaining life. But hospitals that have faced 
requests for sperm or egg extraction from legally authorized surrogate 
decision makers have not felt themselves bound by these laws. So, 
although a 2012 online survey of 1,049 Americans ages 18 to 75 found 
that half of the respondents in an online poll “said they thought a 
person should be able to request sperm or eggs be taken from their 
dead or dying partner,”60 many hospitals still reserve the right to 
refuse the request unless the person making the request is a spouse or 
parent. 
Determining the unexpressed intent of an incompetent patient is 
one of the most common problems in clinical bioethics. These cases 
fall into several major categories including consent to withdraw life-
sustaining treatment, refusal to withdraw life-sustaining treatment, 
consent to terminate or continue a pregnancy,61 and consent to donate 
organs. 
The Supreme Court has established guidelines for preserving the 
medical autonomy of individuals who can make their preferences 
known and those who cannot in a series of important cases which can 
be considered as a trilogy: Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department 
of Health, Washington v. Glucksberg,62 and Vacco v. Quill.63 Following 
 
60. Amy Norton, Public Favors Posthumous Reproduction, with Consent, 
REUTERS (July 13, 2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/13/us-posthumous-
reproduction-idUSBRE86C0ZK20120713 (noting that 70% of those 
would require mandatory written consent). 
61. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1240 (D.C. 1990) (granting a hospital’s 
motion to deliver by caesarean section, a twenty-six-and-a-half-week-old 
fetus from a 28-year-old woman dying of cancer in the face of opposition 
from the pregnant woman’s parents). 
62. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997). 
63. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 804 (1997). 
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Cruzan,64 states may require “clear and convincing” evidence of a 
patient’s past wishes before honoring a surrogate’s decision to remove 
life-sustaining equipment.65 Some states like Missouri do require such 
evidence while others do not.66 These states instead allow surrogate 
decision makers to make these decisions based on the standard that it 
“more probably than not” reflected the patient’s wishes. 
D. Financial Considerations: Who Pays? 
One of the concerns with leaving decisions about posthumous 
conception to hospitals and medical staff is the issue of cost. Even if 
the patient is alive, few employers provide insurance coverage for 
fertility benefits. Although there is no legal barrier to their doing so, 
no state’s Medicaid plan provides fertility benefits nor does the federal 
Medicaid program or the Veteran’s Administration. Without the 
requirement to cover fertility treatments, insurance companies need 
only cover medically necessary treatments.67 There is an increasing 
body of literature describing the legal and ethical issues surrounding 
the collection of gametes for posthumous reproduction at the end of 
life.68 
E. Transplantation of Reproductive Organs 
The first reported successful transplantation of a reproductive 
organ from one woman to another occurred between identical twins in 
2008.69 Since then, uterine transplants have become, if not 
commonplace, then certainly not rare. Ovaries, however, are different. 
A uterine transplant provides a place for the embryo to gestate. 
 
64. Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 261 (1990). 
65. See Alexia M. Torke, Substituted Judgment: The Limitations of 
Autonomy in Surrogate Decision Making, 23 J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 1514, 
1515 (2008). 
66. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 268. 
67. See Kathy L. Cerminara, Hospice & Health Care Reform: Improving 
Care at the End of Life, 17 WIDENER L. REV. 443, 453 (2011); AM. 
CANCER SOC’Y, AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: HOW IT HELPS PEOPLE WITH 
CANCER & THEIR FAMILIES, 
http://action.acscan.org/site/DocServer/Affordable_Care_Act_Throug
h_the_Cancer_Lens_Final.pdf?docID=18421 (last visited Jan. 20, 
2014). 
68. Caprice Knapp et al., Posthumous Reproduction & Palliative Care, 14 J. 
PALLIATIVE MED. 895, 896 (2011). 
69. Gordon Rayner & Rebecca Smith, Ovary Transplant Mother Speaks of 
Her “Indescribable” Joy After Giving Birth, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 14, 
2008), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/womens-
health/3460954/Ovary-transplant-mother-speaks-of-her-indescribable-
joy-after-giving-birth.html. 
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Ovaries, on the other hand, contain the actual oocytes that when 
combined with sperm, develop into embryos. Uterine transplants are 
still considered experimental.70  
But consider this: Every adult woman carries within her ovaries 
all the oocytes that will be available for fertilization and development 
into a biological child. This is in contrast to sperm, which die and are 
replenished by the testis throughout a man’s lifetime. So, every 
woman who dies before menopause (and thus before exhausting her 
supply of oocytes) is taking to her grave perhaps hundreds of 
potential children. 
The interest in reproductive organ transplants strongly suggests 
equal interest in a similar situation only recently made possible by 
evolving medical technology: The possibility of initiating a pregnancy 
through ART when the mother who is to carry the child is in a 
permanent vegetative state or has been declared brain-dead. Although 
it is easy to overuse the phrase “stranger than fiction” when 
discussing the frontiers of ART, in fact, requests for posthumous 
sperm donation have become, if not common, then not rare, and 
recent improvements in technology have already resulted in reported 
cases involving egg retrieval.  
F. Separating the Dead from the Almost Dead 
Although the line between life and death may be a continuum in 
medicine, in law it is as definite as a light switch. Living people have 
rights and interests and dead people do not. Relatives and heirs of 
dead people have rights in the deceased’s body and how it is treated, 
just as they may have rights in her property.71 
In an article discussing the close relationship to abortion politics 
and technology, Professor John Robertson writes: 
Neonatal intensive care technology has consistently extended 
viability to earlier stages of pregnancy, so that viability in some 
sense has been pushed back from the twenty-four to twenty-
eight weeks first recognized in Roe to twenty-two weeks or 
earlier, allowing 500–600-gram fetuses to survive, albeit with a 
 
70. See Sarah B. Rodriguez & Lisa Campo-Engelstein, Conceiving 
Wholeness: Women, Motherhood, and Ovarian Transplantation, 1902 
and 2004, 54.3 PERSP. IN BIOLOGY & MED. 409, 412 (2011); Nick Collins, 
Australian Woman Pregnant After Pioneering Ovarian Transplant, 
TELEGRAPH, Sept. 2, 2013 (“More than 20 people worldwide have 
undergone ovarian tissue transplants, but the latest operation is the first 
to successfully transplant the tissue into a different area of the body.”). 
71. Dahlia Lithwick, Habeas Corpses: What are the Rights of Dead People?, 
SLATE, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2002/0
3/habeas_corpses.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2014). 
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high risk of disability and impairment, thus giving antiabortion 
forces more room to ban abortions. 72 
Robertson notes that Justice O’Connor was well aware of what 
she described as a “collision course” between advancing technology 
and the trimester schedule of pregnancy in Roe v. Wade which is why 
in Casey v. Planned Parenthood she abandoned it in favor of an 
“undue burden” analysis.73 But it is one thing to push viability back 
to the second trimester and another to contemplate technology that 
could interrupt a pregnancy at any stage without significantly 
lowering the chances of a healthy, live birth. 
III. Scenario Analysis 
The scenarios below are drawn from the literature and from Dr. 
Penrose’s personal experience. They consist of situations in which a 
family might request the intervention of an assisted reproductive 
technology team to preserve the future fertility of a woman who 
either meets the legal criteria for brain death or who has suffered 
irrevocably incapacitating brain death. 
A. Scenario 1: ART Interrupted 
A thirty-two-year-old female and her thirty-five-year-old husband 
have tried for three years to conceive a child. The couple has been 
diagnosed with blocked tubes, which is considered female factor 
infertility, and low motility, which is considered male factor 
infertility. It has been recommended that they undergo in vitro 
fertilization (IVF) with intra-cytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI). The 
day before the scheduled egg retrieval, the woman is in a car accident. 
She sustains massive head trauma and is declared brain-dead. The 
family wishes to keep the woman on life support until the next day so 
her oocytes can be harvested as scheduled, then cultured with her 
husband’s sperm, and frozen as embryos until a surrogate can be 
identified. The family also wishes to donate the woman’s organs. 
1. Medical Analysis 
While additional medical support will be needed to sustain the 
patient through the oocyte retrieval, this case of perimortem oocyte 
retrieval is straightforward from a medical standpoint, provided there 
were no internal injuries in the lower abdomen. The ovaries have 
already been stimulated to create many mature oocytes with a good 
 
72. John Robertson, Abortion and Technology: Sonograms, Fetal Pin, 
Viability, and Early Prenatal Diagnosis, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 327, 337 
(2011). 
73. Id. 
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chance of fertilization. Sustaining the hormone profile necessary to 
complete maturation of the follicles can easily be maintained through 
the injections the patient was already receiving. The physician and 
laboratory are already prepared to harvest and culture the oocytes 
and embryos to the blastocyst stage prior to freezing. 
Cryopreservation will most likely be required, as it is highly unlikely 
that a surrogate mother can be identified who: (1) is at the right 
point in her menstrual cycle to optimize chances of conception, (2) 
can be tested and cleared medically to be both free of communicable 
diseases and physically fit to serve as a surrogate, and (3) complete all 
required documentation in time to allow a fresh embryo transfer.74 
2. Legal Analysis 
The first legal distinction in this case is the woman’s status as 
either a living or a dead person. Each state has a specific statute 
defining the criteria for declaring an individual dead. The vast 
majority of states make that distinction based on an assessment of 
brain function. These laws take as their premise that the human brain 
is comprised of three parts: the brain stem, the middle brain, and the 
higher brain. For a person to be declared dead, a physician must 
swear to a medical certainty that the individual has permanently lost 
function in all three parts of the brain.75 Such a person lacks the 
ability to direct her body to perform any of the functions necessary to 
maintain blood circulation. Thus, without mechanical intervention 
and chemical stimulation, that person’s heart, lungs, and every other 
organ in the body will stop working thereby allowing decay to begin. 
If this woman has no brain function at all, but her body is being kept 
animated by mechanical means, then the legal basis for extracting her 
eggs will be the same as for any other organ donation. She will have 
ceased to legally exist as a person, and her family76 will now acquire 
 
74. See generally Claus Y. Andersen et al., Long-Term Duration of 
Function of Ovarian Tissue Transplants: Case Reports, 25(2) REPROD. 
BIOMED ONLINE 128, 130-31 (2012). 
75. Eelco F.M. Wijdicks et al., Evidence-based Guideline Update: 
Determining Brain Death in Adults, 74 NEUROLOGY 1911, 1911 (2010). 
76. The word “family” here is used for clarity of argument, but of course 
the legal concept of who can make decisions on behalf of an individual 
incapable of making her own either because of incompetency or death is 
far more nuanced. Living individuals have the right to designate any 
competent person as their surrogate decision maker. In the absence of a 
specific designation, each state has established a hierarchy of surrogate 
decision makers. While these laws all give primacy to “family,” how that 
term is defined and by what method others can be empowered to make 
these decisions varies significantly. 
 Also, as a matter of law, while an incompetent person retains the full 
legal rights as every other living person, it is the ability to exercise these 
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the legal ability to control what happens to her remains within the 
restrictions of public health laws governing the handling of corpses. 
The laws relevant to organ donation have not yet been extended 
to ovum. This means that unless there is a need for the state to 
examine her body as a matter of criminal law or to investigate a 
possible danger to the public’s health, no one but her family has the 
legal right to extract her ovum. Equally, there is so far in the United 
States no individual or entity with standing to prevent her family 
from taking this action. However, if a state wanted to impose a 
restriction on the family’s right, it is likely that the state’s interest in 
the life and potential life of everyone in its jurisdiction would allow it 
to do so.  
Still, there is one substantial difference: So far, the interest 
recognized by the Supreme Court has been one in preserving life. A 
state therefore can limit the ability of a woman to have an abortion. 
It can also require a higher burden of proof from those who, on behalf 
of an incompetent woman, seek to withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining treatment. Given that the Supreme Court has recognized a 
state’s ability to intercede in the exercise of a living woman’s 
fundamental liberty interest in terminating a pregnancy, it is likely 
that they would grant the state power to do so when the woman is 
dead. The dead have no constitutional rights. 
A good starting point for this analysis is to agree to the premise 
that the rights recognized by the U.S. Constitution exist separately 
from the technological advances that affect the way people live and 
interact. In the case of a woman’s right to privacy, for example, the 
fact that there were no safe and effective means of abortion at the 
time the Constitution was written does not mean that laws written 
today must reflect those constraints. After all, the Supreme Court is 
frequently required to consider the effects of modern technology (such 
as long lens cameras, high-powered microphones, and internet 
tracking devices) on previously established limits to governmental 
intrusion on privacy.  
So with the arrival of technology that makes it possible to salvage 
an unfertilized ovum, a fertilized ovum, or a very young embryo, 
 
rights which is transferred to a substitute, or surrogate, decision maker. 
In contrast, a dead person has no rights of her own. Upon death, a 
person becomes a corpse for which legally identified individuals (that is, 
“family”) acquire quasi-property rights. “Quasi,” in that the rights are 
ones of control of disposition, not actual ownership. It is, therefore, not 
legal to sell a corpse even though a family’s right to direct the method 
of burial has been repeatedly confirmed in high dollar tort verdicts on 
behalf of families who claim improper burial procedures. These rights 
coexist with the state’s rights to protect the public’s health in the 
proper disposition of bodies as well as the need to gather information for 
criminal trials or disease monitoring or control. 
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comes the need for a new understanding of the balance between a 
woman’s right to both privacy and bodily integrity with the state’s 
right to preserve and promote life. The question for today is this: 
Does the state have a right to prevent a family from extracting the 
ovum of a dead woman? But the question for tomorrow is likely to be 
a more interesting one: Can the state require, even in the face of the 
family’s objections, the extraction of potential life from a dead or 
incompetent woman? 
The premise of the current balance that the Supreme Court has 
struck between the mother’s right to bodily integrity and the state’s 
right to preserve life has been that there is a time period before which 
an embryo or fetus cannot survive outside of its mother’s body. That 
concept is described as “viability.” As medical technology advances in 
its ability to sustain younger and younger embryos outside of the 
mother’s womb, the date of viability gets pushed further and further 
back. If it is possible to sustain the potential life of an ovum or, in an 
even stronger case, the life of a fertilized embryo outside of its 
mother’s body, then a state may well take the choice away from the 
family and demand extraction.77 
3. Ethical Analysis 
In this case where the couple has already begun the process of 
assisted reproduction, the issue of intent is clearer. Unlike other 
situations, both the intended mother and intended father have, by 
their actions, expressly agreed to create embryos and to have the 
intended mother carry them to term. However, in the absence of any 
contract or other documentation about what to do in case of the 
death of either party, both intent and consent, from an ethical point 
of view, are still at issue. Just because the intended mother wanted to 
gestate an embryo that would become her child does not mean that 
she would have wanted to create a child that lived on after her death. 
The fact that she and the father are married and that they had 
already begun the IVF process makes it more likely that this would 
become a wanted child. Had the accident occurred after the embryo 
had been implanted, its status would be the same as any biological 
child being raised by the father after the mother’s death. Without 
evidence that the mother had contemplated this situation and had 
expressed her wishes about what to do with the embryos if she died 
 
77. Another way states have approached regulating the posthumous use of 
embryos has been through restrictions on what becomes of embryos 
which are not immediately implanted. Julie Shapiro, Disposition of 
Frozen Embryos: Maryland Court Chooses the Person Who Wants to 
Use Them, JULIESHAPIRO.WORDPRESS.COM (Jan. 10, 2013), 
http://julieshapiro.wordpress.com/2013/01/10/disposition-of-frozen-
embryos-maryland-court-chooses-the-person-who-wants-to-use-them. 
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before she could gestate them, it would be just to let the father go 
ahead with their plan and move forward with the IVF. 
B. Scenario 2: Just Starting Out Together 
A twenty-five-year-old female and her twenty-five-year-old fiancé 
have discussed their wish to have children in the future and are doing 
nothing at this time to prevent conception. The woman is diagnosed 
with an advanced-stage aggressive cancer and must start treatment 
before fertility preservation may be performed. In spite of superior 
medical care, the young woman passes away shortly after her 
diagnosis. The fiancé requests that her oocytes be harvested so that 
he may still attempt to have children with her. 
1. Medical Analysis 
From a medical standpoint, this case of postmortem oocyte 
retrieval is fraught with difficulty. Harvesting oocytes from a female 
who is at an unknown stage of the menstrual cycle is difficult and 
could result in no oocytes being harvested, for instance during the 
luteal phase after ovulation. Depending upon the pervasiveness of her 
disease and the course of treatment, her menstrual cycle could have 
ceased or been severely compromised, indicating that there may be no 
developing follicles to harvest for in vitro maturation (IVM) 
techniques. Immature oocytes are not uncommon, accounting for 10 
to 15 percent of oocytes harvested during an IVF cycle. Oocyte 
maturity is evaluated based upon morphological changes that occur 
within the oocyte structure as the time of ovulation approaches and 
fall into three stages named after these morphological changes: 
germinal vesicle stage (GV), metaphase I stage (M1), and metaphase 
II stage (M2) which represents mature oocytes. While pregnancy has 
been achieved using IVM from oocytes at the GV and M1 stages, the 
process of maturing these oocytes has not been perfected into an 
exacting protocol. There has been some success bringing M1 oocytes 
to the M2 stage by culturing them with cumulus cells and sperm. 
Others have suggested that culturing with cumulus cells and follicular 
fluid will stimulate GV stage cells to mature to M2. The likelihood of 
success would depend largely on the stage of the menstrual cycle the 
woman was in at the time of her death, or if she was suffering from 
amenorrhea or some other factor that would compromise her fertility, 
and the skill of the facility that would undertake the process of 
harvesting and potentially using IVM to obtain freezable embryos. 
2. Legal Analysis 
As this woman was in a long-term relationship with a man she 
intended to marry, this procedure would fall under the rules governing 
sexually intimate partners. However, because this couple has not 
previously been evaluated at an infertility clinic, it is impossible to 
rule out male factor infertility as an additional hurdle to creating 
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embryos for cryopreservation. Because the embryos would have to be 
transferred into a third party for conception, all surrogate rules would 
apply.  
If the state’s interest in preserving life extends to retrieval of 
ovum, then this woman’s situation is no different than the others. But 
if the issue here is one in which a court must analyze the woman’s 
interest in procreating, then this falls in the category of cases where 
courts have analyzed the unexpressed wishes of a biological parent to 
bring offspring into the world. Here again, there are no relevant laws. 
Courts have decided these issues based on common law principles of 
contract and consent. 
Here, the process of extraction imposes a high burden on the 
woman. This would be dispositive if her legal surrogates were 
objecting. But if, like in the International Traveler case, there were no 
objection from her family, but rather a concern raised by the medical 
team, then the issue of burden would be highly relevant. 
Also, primary to an analysis of this scenario is the understanding 
that there is no common law obligation whatsoever on any medical 
professional to engage in activity against his or her medical judgment. 
The medical team here would not be facing an order by a court 
requiring them to extract the ovum. More likely, they would be facing 
a lawsuit by the family seeking damages for their failure to do so. 
This lawsuit would require that the family prove that the medical 
professionals acted below the standard of care of a reasonable 
professional.  
3. Ethical Analysis 
Unlike the couple who had already begun the process of IVF at 
the time of the accident, there is no evidence that this young couple 
had ever contemplated becoming parents. However, the fact that they 
were engaged suggests that the woman had already decided that if she 
were going to become a mother, this individual would be the father. 
Again, there is a strong analogy here to the status of a living child or 
a frozen embryo whose parent has died. The legal and ethical 
presumption is that unless they had expressed contrary wishes, the 
women had already decided on who would be the father of their 
children and who would raise these children in the event of their 
death. In contrast to the preceding scenario, although being engaged 
suggests intent to have children and raise them with this particular 
man, the lack of information about the woman’s wishes to have 
children at this time or to have children raised without her presence 
raises ethical concerns. Perhaps she did not believe her fiancé was 
ready to be a father. Also, by not being alive when her child is born, 
she is in the same situation as the woman who had already started 
IVF in terms of having someone else becoming the mother of her 
child. Without clear indicia that she wanted to have a biological child 
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in the near future, the lack of evidence about how she would feel 
about that child being raised by someone else is of concern. 
C. Scenario 3: The Single Teenager 
A seventeen-year-old female is killed while riding her friend’s 
motorcycle. She has never expressed an interest in having children. 
However, her parents have read about a new procedure used in cancer 
patients where the ovarian cortex, the part of the ovary containing 
the primordial oocytes, can be harvested and frozen, then 
transplanted back onto the woman’s ovary or onto a donor ovary.  
1. Medical Analysis 
Early research has reported successful spontaneous pregnancy in 
women who have undergone this procedure. The young woman’s 
parents wish to have the ovarian cortex of their daughter harvested so 
her mother or a surrogate can undergo ART treatment to conceive a 
grandchild. But none of that research was done on minors. So if it is 
performed on the teenager, it will involve using a methodology that 
has not been tested in girls her age.  
Very few programs have the technical know-how to perform this 
type of procedure. Not only is the harvesting of the ovarian cortex 
and reapplying it difficult, it requires a skilled surgeon. The methods 
for freezing whole explants of tissue are in their infancy. A more 
viable option for this family would be in vitro maturation. By all 
accounts, the female in question was healthy and young with no 
known infertility issues. The likelihood of recovering oocytes from her 
ovaries that are in the GV and M1 stage are fairly good depending 
upon the stage of the menstrual cycle that the woman was in at the 
time of her accident. If there are oocytes, even immature oocytes, a 
donor sample could be acquired from a commercial bank and used to 
create embryos, which currently tend to survive freezing better than 
oocytes, though many practices are now offering oocyte freezing as a 
method for fertility preservation for young women either undergoing 
treatment for cancer or desiring to delay childbirth.  
2. Legal Analysis 
Because the teenager in our scenario is dead, she is not legally a 
patient eligible for medical care. As a result, the fact that she was a 
minor when she died does not change the legal ability of her parents 
to make decisions on her behalf. Once she died, the legal framework 
shifts from one of surrogate decision making to property interest in a 
dead body. Had the girl been an adult, she could have left 
postmortem instructions about who would be allowed to take custody 
of and bury her body. But as a minor, any such documentation would 
be void. What the parents are asking, essentially, is to donate their 
daughter’s corpse for scientific research. Legally, they have a quasi-
property interest in the body and can transfer it to the research team. 
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Courts have recognized a family’s right to control the use of a dead 
body. For example, the family could decide to release her body for 
research, yet stipulate that it be returned for burial. Here, what the 
family is asking—specifically, that they be given access to her ovarian 
cortex—is the legal equivalent of a directed organ or tissue donation. 
Such directed donations are legal. 
3. Ethical Analysis 
This scenario presents some of the most troubling issues regarding 
consent and intent. This young girl was a minor and had expressed no 
interest in becoming a mother, nor had she taken any steps in that 
direction. On a continuum, there is far less evidence of whether she 
would have wanted to reproduce in this situation than in the previous 
scenarios involving the young, engaged couple and the couple who had 
started IVF. In all these cases, we do not know what the mothers 
would have wanted in the event of their death. But here, this 
teenager is so far from giving any indication of what decisions she 
would want to have made if she had been alive, that it is a situation 
where the parents are essentially making a decision for themselves. If 
these potential grandparents wanted more children, there is no law 
stopping them from hiring a surrogate and an egg donor. As a matter 
of ethics, however, it would be reasonable for the clinic to ask whether 
it would have agreed to accept this girl for IVF had she been alive 
and interested in having children, but for some reason unable to do so 
herself. This is not an exact parallel because the question would be 
whether this teen had the maturity to make a decision about being a 
mother and here, of course, those duties would be taken over by the 
grandparents. 
Conclusion 
Advances in technology that now make it possible to initiate 
assisted reproduction after a woman is dead or suffers a brain injury 
that renders her permanently unconscious requires that lawyers, 
doctors, and ethicists reconsider the laws and principles that had 
previously governed assisted reproductive technology. Although the 
experience of addressing requests for sperm extraction from a man 
who cannot give consent are somewhat helpful, the vastly more 
complex process of initiating reproduction in a woman presents new 
and significant challenges. The cases that have arisen as well as those 
foreshadowed by the scenarios in this article highlight further how 
serious the gaps in the legal regulation of assisted reproduction have 
become. By applying legal and ethical analysis to current and 
forthcoming processes for initiating reproduction in women who are 
permanently unconscious or who meet the legal criteria to be declared 
brain-dead, this article hopes to be of assistance to not just clinicians 
and families, but also to those lawyers and lawmakers who can play a 
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role in resolving the legal issues raised by requests for assisted 
reproductive technology when a woman can no longer give consent.  
The biological differences between female and male reproduction 
makes the use of assisted reproductive technology after death a far 
more complicated process in the case of women than in men. Rather 
than a simple procedure that can be performed on a male corpse, 
female posthumous assisted reproduction requires sustaining a woman 
for two weeks or more on life-support machines. Moreover, the legal 
consent issues, while ostensibly the same as for men, raise different 
cultural concerns when an egg from a dead biological mother is 
removed, fertilized, and implanted in a surrogate who may or may not 
have the intent of raising the child. Not only does this represent a 
substantially greater use of scarce resources, it also brings into clearer 
focus the legal and ethical concerns about ART in general and PAR 
in specific that may have evaded scrutiny with less complex 
procedures. 
The new reality of children conceived after their mother has died 
or become permanently unconscious will need to be recognized in the 
array of family and inheritance law issues already created by 
posthumous reproduction. But this reality will also need to be 
incorporated into societal norms and values that are still adapting to 
the changes in what can be possible in the creation of new human life. 
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